From Willick v. Sanson, determined Thursday by the Nevada Supreme Courtroom.
Petitioners Marshal S. Willick and Willick Regulation Group (collectively, Willick) filed a grievance in opposition to respondents Steve Sanson and Veterans in Politics Worldwide, Inc. (collectively, Sanson), alleging that they made defamatory statements in opposition to Willick on-line. In response, Sanson filed a particular movement to dismiss the motion pursuant to Nevada’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Towards Public Participation) statute, NRS 41.660 [which provides for attorney fees if the defendant wins, but after a good deal of litigation and while a renewed anti-SLAPP motion was pending, Willick moved to voluntarily dismiss the case] …. The district court docket [rejected Willick’s attempt] …. Willick … ask[s] us to vacate the district court docket’s order….
[E]stopping Willick from voluntarily dismissing his case serves NRCP 41(a)(l)(A)(i)‘s important function on this occasion…. Willick waited a very long time—4 years—earlier than submitting his discover of voluntary dismissal. Additional, he filed this discover solely after this court docket reversed a district court docket order favorable to his case, and sooner or later after a failed mediation try. These occasions themselves occurred after a listening to on the anti-SLAPP movement. By now, the deserves of the anti-SLAPP movement’s first prong have been totally raised, decided, appealed, reviewed de novo, and remanded. Now, Willick and Sanson await the district court docket’s dedication on the movement’s second prong.
“Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes goal to guard First Modification rights by offering defendants with a procedural mechanism to dismiss ‘meritless lawsuit[s] {that a} get together initiates primarily to sit back a defendant’s train of his or her First Modification free speech rights’ earlier than incurring the prices of litigation.” Right here, at this level within the proceedings, Sanson has little doubt incurred litigation prices.
Given these distinctive and excessive circumstances, we conclude that Willick is estopped from dismissing his motion with no penalties, because the litigation has reached a sophisticated stage after 4 years and a previous de novo attraction. Subsequently, we conclude that the district court docket didn’t manifestly abuse its discretion by, or lack jurisdiction when, vacating petitioners’ discover of voluntary dismissal. For these causes, we deny Willick’s petition for a writ of mandamus and prohibition.
Congratulations to Margaret A. McLetchie on the victory.